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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
In the

~latter

of the Application
of

Case No. 7436

ROBERT FOLLETTE
For Writ of Habeas Corpus

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment made and entered
in favor of the petitioner, Robert Follette, in the District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 8th day of November,
1949, wherein the Honorable J. Allen Crockett granted petioner' s writ of habeas corpus releasing him from the custody
of Alvin 0. Severson, Warden of the Utah State Prison.
The petitioner, Robert Follette, had plead guilty to the
crime of second degree burglary in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about the 17th day of
August, 1940, (Amended Findings of Fact ~~o. 1), and on
or about the 24th day of August, 1940, was sentenced to an
3
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indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of from one to
twenty years. (Amended Findings of Fact No. 2). However, he was granted a stay of execution of said sentence until
November 21, '1940, and placed in the custody of the Chief
Agent of the Adult Parole and Probation Department of the
State of Utah. (Amended Findings of Fact No'. 2).
On or about the 23rd day of November, 1940, the said
Robert Follette appeared before the above-entitled court at
which time he was granted a further stay and ordered to appear
before the said court on the 15th day .of March, 1941. (Am:ended Findings of Fact No. 3).
. The said Robert Follette failed to appear before the
above-entitled court on March 15, 1941, as ordered. (Amended
Findings of Fact No. 6). Furthermore, the Adult Parole
and Probation Department did not know his whereabouts
because he had not reported to them since November 4, 1940,
(Amended Findings of Fact No. 5), even though he had entered
into an agreement with that department to make monthly
reports to them concerning his doings and whereabout. (Amended Findings of Fact No. 5). On March 15, 1941, therefore, the date when the said Robert Follette was ordered to
appear before the above-entitled court, the court, upon the
recommendation of the Adult Parole and Probation Departn1ent entered its order refusing to grant a further stay to the
said Robert Follette, and, at the same time, entered its order
_that a commitment issue. Thereupon, on March 17, 1941,
a commitment did issue. (Amended Findings of Fact No.6).
Subsequently, and on or about the 7th day of August,
1949, the said Robert Follette was seized and apprehended in

4
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Logan, Utah, (Amended Findings of Fact No.7), and on or
about the lOth day of August, 1949, (Return to Writ of
Habeas Corpus), was placed in the Utah State Prison under
the custody of Alvin 0. Severson, Warden, the appellant in
this proceeding, pursuant to the order of commitment which
had been duly issued by the District Court of Salt Lake County
on March 17, 1941.
On November 8, 1949, the petitioner, Robert Follette,
was released from the custody of Alvin 0. Severson, Warden
of the Utah State Prison, by an order of the Honorable J.
Allen Crockett, one of the Judges of the District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, granting petitioner's writ of
habeas corpus. It is from the order granting petitioner's wtit
of habeas corpus that appellant prosecutes this appeal.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The court erred in concluding as a matter of law that

the said Robert Follette should have been served with a summons and/or citation advising him of the time and place when
the question of his violation of probation would be considered
by an agency having authority to make investigation and determination thereof.
2. The court erred in concluding as a matter of law that

the said Robert Follette should have had an opportunity to
secure witnesses by compulsory process and to cross-examine
such witnesses as might testify to his violation of probation
in behalf of the state, or to make any defense of his position
or to make any such explanation as might be necessary.
5
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·3. The court erred in concluding as a matter of law that
the ·deprival of the privileges set forth above in points 1 and
2 was contrary to the procedural due process guaranteed under
Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
4. The court erred in granting the said Robert Follette's
petition for writ of habeas corpus.

ARGUMENT
In view of the fact that all of the aforesaid points involve
substantially the same principles of law, they are consolidated
herein for purpose of argument.
It is the contention of appellant in this appeal that essentially the only question involved in a habeas corpus proceeding
is one of jurisdiction; namely, whether the order, judgment or
proc·ess under attack came within the lawful authority of the
court or offcer issuing it. In 25 Am. Jur. 159, Habeas Corpus,
Section 26, it is stated that:
The primary and, ordinariiy, the only question involved in habeas corpus proceedings is one of jurisdiction-namely, whether the particular order, judgment or process whose validity is attacked is one coming
within the lawful authority of the court or officer making or issuing it. As it may otherwise be stated, in
the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, the
scope of inquiry, where restraint is had by virtue of legal
process, is ordinarily limited to the validty of the process
on its face and the jurisdiction of the court by which
it was issued. The writ does not lie to correct errors
and irregularities committed in the exercise of jurisdiction; but cognizane is taken only of such defects

6
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as render absolutely void the proceedings under which
the petitioner is imprisoned. In short, the writ reaches
jurisdictional error only; it cannot properly be used to
serve the mere purpose of an appeal or \vrit of error.
It will be noted that the record in this case shows, conclusively that Robert Follette appeared before the court on
or about November 23, 1940, at which time he was granted a
further stay of execution and ordered to appear again before
the court on March 15, 1941. On the latter date he failed to
appear and the court thereupon refused to grant a further stay
of execution and issued an order of commitment pursuant
to which he was subsequently confined in the Utah State
Prison. There can be no question, therefore, that on the
expiration of the stay of execution on March 15, 1941, the
court had jurisdiction to refuse to grant a further stay of
execution and thereupon to issue an order of commitment. On
this jurisdictonal question no hearing was necessary. In 15
Am. Jur. 147, Criminal Law, Section 496, it is stated that:
When the execution of a sentence is properly stayed,
the court does not thereby lose power thereafter to enforce the sentence. It may enforce it at any subsequent
time, even after the orginal period of the sentence has
passed. * * *
The fact that a defendant who is granted a stay of
execution for a specified time leaves the jurisdiction of
the court and remains away until the expiration of his
term does not prevent the court from enforcing the
sentence after his return.
So in this case, the fact that the order of commitn1ent was
issued on March 17, 1941, and that Robert Follette was not
7
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thereafter seized and apprehended until on or about August
7, 1949, and was thereupon confined in the Utah State Prison
on or about August 10, 1949, pursuant to that order of commitment, the court was not deprived of its power or jurisdiction to eriforce the sentence previously imposed. See also the
annotations in 3 A. L. R. 1017 and 97 A. L. R. 811.
In State vs. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044, 54 A.
L. R~ 1463, a case decided not on habeas corpus proceedings
but on appeal from an order of revocation of a suspended
sentence, it is said:
A person who has a sentence suspended during good
behavior, without any limitations, is entitled to a
hearing upon the question of whether or not he has
complied with the conditions imposed; that such hearing must be according to some well recognized and
established rules of judicial procedure; that defendant
is entitled to have filed either an affidavit, motion, or
other written pleading, setting forth the facts relied
upon for a revocation of the suspension of sentence;
that defendant should be given an opportunity to
answer or plead to the charge made; that a hearing
should be had upon the issue joined; and that defendant
as vv-ell as the state be given the right of cross-examination.
While this Honorable Court in subsequent cases dealing with
the revocation of a suspended sentence reiterated, with certain
marked limitations, the broad general rule announced in the
Zolantakis case, supra, it nevertheless criticized the rule therein
stated, and, by ·inference at least, indicated that it might hold
otherwise if it presently had to decide a case involving a similar
set of facts. See Williams vs. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P.
8
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(2d) 640; State vs. Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 150 P. (2d) 970; and
Christiansen vs. Harris, 109 Utah 1; 163 P. (2d) 314. It is
to be noted, too, that in all of the aforesaid cases involving
the matter of revocation of a suspended sentence, the question
as to whether or not the terms or conditions upon which the
suspension of sentence was granted had or had not been violated, was one upon which reasonable men could honestly
differ and therefore required a hearing for the determination
of that very issue. In the present case, however, there was no
such question. Robert Follette failed to appear before the
court on March 15, 1941, as he was ordered to do on or about
November 23, 1940. The court thereupon refused to grant him
a further stay of execution and entered its order that a commitment issue. Pursuant to that comniitment which was
issued on March 17, 1941, Robert Follette was subsequently
committed to the Utah State Prison. Appellant contends
Robert Follette was rightfully committed.
It is respectfully submitted that it matters not why Robert
Follette failed to appear before the court on March 15, 1941.
His stay expired at that time and the court then had jurisdiction to see that the lawful sentence previously imposed was
duly executed. In exercising its jurisdiction the court issued
an order of commitment, and when Robert Follette was finally
seized and apprehended, he was lawfully committed in the
Utah ~tate Prison. There was no necessity for a hearing on
such commitment.
In Demmick vs. Harris, 106 Utah 32, 144 P. (2d) 761,
a case involving, as does the present case, the legality of an
order of commitment issued after the expiration of a stay of

9
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execution of a sentence and not uport the revocation of a suspended sentence, this Honorable Court held that:
The case * * * does not clearly come within the holding of the Zolantakis case. That case involved a suspension of a sentence during good behavior without any
limitation as to time. The stay order here was for a
definite length of time. It was not revoked-it ex.pired. Upon its expiraton the defendant was committed in accordance with the judgment and sentence
previously imposed. The petitioner has failed to carry
his burden of proving that he was unlawfully committed.
Even if it be assumed in the present case, for the purpose of
argument, that Robert Follette was given a stay to a day certain
with an implied promise that if he complied with the terms
and conditions imposed he would be granted a further stay, he
failed to comply with the court's order requiring him to appear
before it on March 15, 1941, to determine whether or not
a further stay should be granted. As to his failure to comply
with the court's order to appear before it on March 15, 1941,
there could be no difference of opinion. Under such circumstances, certainly the court was not bound to and should not
have granted him a further stay. Its only alternative was to
issue an order of commitment, which was done.
Finally, in McCoy vs. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P. (2d)
721, which involved the revocation of a parole, this Honorable
Court held that a parole was merely the granting of a conditional privilege which could be revoked at any time without
the necessity of a hearing. In the course of the opinion it
was stated:
10
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Both logic and authority impels the holding under
our statutes and system that a parolee is not entitled
as of right to notice and hearing before revocation of
a parole.
Certainly it cannot be successfully argued that a person ordered
to appear before the court at the expiration of the stay of
execution of his sentence who fails to do so is entitled to greater
rights and privileges than a parolee whose parole may be revoked at any time without the necessity of a hearing. Nor can
it be successfully argued that at such time the court has lost
jurisdiction to carry out the sentence previously imposed.
In Ex Parte Sichofsky, D.C. Cal., 273 F. 694, affirmed C.C.A.,
·Sichofsky vs. U. S., 277 F. 762, a habeas corpus proceeding,
it was contended that the District Court lost all its jursdiction
by granting several stays of execution and by permitting the
petitioner to be tried in the state court for the crime of grand
larceny. The court said however:
I discover nothing, however, based either upon
reason or authority, from which t may now be adjudged
that the action of this court, in temporarily staying the
execution of the judgment of this court, served to
divest this court of jurisdiction to require petitioner
to stand for judgment as per the admitted violation of
the federal law. It would be a strange and bold assertion, in my judgment, for this court, possessing the
amplest jurisdiction as above referred to, to hold that
it had completely divested itself of all jurisdiction in
the premises merely by an order staying execution.

11
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CONCLUSION
Appellant contends that on March 15, 1941, the District
Court of Salt Lake County did have jurisdiction to issue an
order of commitment for Robert Follette in executing the
sentence previously imposed upon him, and that the subsequent
commitment of Robert Follette pursuant to that order was
proper and lawful. Where, as was the fact in this case, a
person is sentenced to a prison term but is granted a stay to
a day certain and ordered to appear before the court to determine whether or not a further stay should be granted, but
fails to appear on the specified date, for whatever reason and
without having been previously excused, a fact concerning
which reasonable men may not honestly differ, he is not entitled to a hearing on the question as to whether or not a commitment should issue. Furthermore, an order of commitment
issued under such circumstances is lawful and does not violate
the procedural due process guaranteed by Article 1, Section 7
of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
The court in effect is merely exercising its jurisdiction in
carrying out the exe~ution of the sentence previously imposed
in accordance with the due process requirements of the Constitution. To hold that on a stay date a court cannot issue an
order of commitment to carry out a lawful sentence previously
imposed, unless and until the defendant is before the court,
would be to vest the defendant with power to deprive the
court of jurisdiction by wrongfully refusing to appear before
it, as ordered, at the expiration of his stay. Certainly the law
does not contemplate such an absurdity.
In conclusion appellant respectfully submits that the

12
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District Court erred in releasing Robert Follette from the custody of the Warden of the Utah State Prison and that itsorder
of November 8, 1949, granting Robert Follette's petition for
writ of habeas corpus should therefore be reversed by this
Honorable Court.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON
Assistant Attorney Genetal
ATJ"ORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
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